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Summary
In the next decades, developed countries will experience dramatic changes in
their demographic trends. The retirement of the wide baby-boom generations, the
increase in life expectancy and the decline in fertility ratios are likely to modify
the size and the age-structure of their populations. The expected population age-
ing in European countries will burden the pension systems, especially wherever
the pay-as-you-go pillar is predominant. Recently, migration has received a wide-
spread attention as a solution to expected population decline and ageing in these
countries. The flow of (young) migrants to developed countries is perceived as
a means to alleviate the financial burden of pension systems. The aim of this con-
tribution is to clarify the issue of aging on labour and capital markets in a macro-
economic perspective. A special attention is given to the risk of imbalances in the
financing of social protection in the context of demographic ageing. 
Introduction
In the next decades, developed countries will experience dramatic changes in
their demographic trends. The retirement of the wide baby-boom generations,
the increase in life expectancy and the decline in fertility ratios are likely to
modify the size and the age-structure of their populations. The expected popula-
tion ageing in European countries will burden the pension systems, especially
wherever  the  pay-as-you-go  pillar  is  predominant.  Recently,  migration  has
received a widespread attention as a solution to expected population decline and
ageing in these countries. The flow of (young) migrants to developed countries is
perceived as a means to alleviate the financial burden of pension systems. The
aim of this contribution is to clarify the issue of aging on labour and capital mar-
kets in a macroeconomic perspective. 
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Over the last century the world population increased from 2 billion to 6 bil-
lion people. The postñWorld War II baby boom in Europe has first increased the
needs for a support of the below working age generations. Since the baby-boom
generations  progressively  reach  maturity,  the  problem  of  supporting  young 
people is being replaced by the issue of supporting the elder ones. Since 1990, the
age group of 15ñ29, which constitutes the main source of new entrants on the
labour markets, has been decreasing rapidly. Furthermore, the average age of
the labour force, which had remained quite stable at around 40 years over seve-
ral decades, has started to increase since 1995 at a speed of one year every
7 years. Finally, the 65+ cohort is expected to grow rapidly in the next five years.
As a result, labour capacity will be considerably reduced in the EU over the next
decades, particularly after 2015.
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The net migration movements and population growths are characterised by
a number of troughs and peaks which generally correspond to well-defined his-
torical events and developments. The German population remains stable during
the last 30 years except a peak in 1990 corresponding to the fall of the Iron
Curtain. At that time an exodus of population from East to West has been taken
place, which gave an increase of German population with 27%. France and Spain
have generally the same evolution of the 15ñ64 age group population (chart 1).
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Source: World Bank Data Base and OECD Report “International Migration Outlook 2007”.
Chart 1. Population growth and migration movements
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60th year. Over the next 20 years the cohorts living the workforce will be larger
then those entering in this category because of the fall in birth rates following
the baby boom period. This means that without positive net migration the work-
ing age population will begin to decline. Italy and Germany are expected to show
a decrease in working age population in case of no migration from the period
2000ñ2005. For Spain the decrease is expected five years later and for France
ten years later (chart 2). 
In  some  of  the  countries  the  migration  has  already  compensated  the
decrease in the working age population. More then 40% of immigrant population
in European countries belongs to 25ñ44 age group (in France 66% of immigrants
are aged 25ñ44 years old). Taking into account the age structure of immigration
(table 8) and in the total population, the loss of growth of the working age popu-
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1 The working age population 15ñ64 for the year 2010 was estimated by taking the popu-
lation 10ñ59 observed in 2005 and ageing it 5 years, under the assumption of no death and no
migration; the working age population 15ñ64 for the year 2015 was estimated by taking the po-
pulation 5ñ54 observed in 2005 and ageing it 10 years, under the assumption of no death and
no migration; the working age population 15ñ64 for the year 2020 was estimated by taking the
population 0ñ49 observed in 2005 and ageing it 15 years, under the assumption of no death and
no migration.
Source: OECD Report “International Migration Outlook 2007”.
Chart 2. Changes in working age population1
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1.7% in Spain and 0.3 in France.
The contribution of international migration on population growth compared
to natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) is more and more impor-
tant. For example, Italy has the highest contribution of net migration to popula-
tion growth in 2004 (chart 3). One exception is France where the contribution of
natural increase on population growth is greater than that of net migration. 
Alders  et  al.  (2007)  within  the  framework  of  the  project  ìUncertain
Population of Europeî, develop a general methodology for constructing predic-
tive  distributions  for  fertility,  mortality  and  migration  combining  three
approaches:  time  series  analysis,  historical  forecast  errors  and  expert  judge-
ments. Sometimes the results are consistent with the UN results and sometimes
they are conflicting. Concerning population growth, they expect a modest annu-
al growth rate of 0.2% in the 18 Europeans countries studied, reaching the 427
million inhabitants by 2050. According to the 2004 revision by the UN, the popu-
lation in the selected countries will decrease between 2030 and 2050 from 407
million to 400 million, after an initial increase from the current level of 392 mil-
lion (United Nations, 2005). While some recuperation in fertility rate is likely,
there  is  no  evidence  that  it  will  rise  significantly  from  the  current  levels.
Concerning mortality, most demographic forecasters generally expected a slow-
down of the improvement in life expectancy, eventually leading to stagnation.
The UPE team expects that it is more likely that current rates of decline will
continue, thus leading to a larger future population than predicted by the offi-
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Source: OECD Report “International Migration Outlook 2007”.
Chart 3. Components of population change
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the number of people aged 65 + appears rather high in the UPE forecast. For
France, Italy and Germany the UPE forecasts of people aged 65+ in 2050 are
much higher (18.20 million, 19.29 million and 25.02 million respectively) com-
pared to the estimations of UN (17.11 million, 18.09 million and 22.38 million)
(Appendix). 
1.2. Labour markets
Since 1995 most European countries knew strong growth in employment.
The largest increase over the period 1995ñ2005 was observed in Spain (16,5%).
The net job creation amounted to nearly 7 million in Spain and 2 million in
France. A large contribution to this dynamic has been done by immigration.
Apart from France, immigrant employment has a stronger growth than the labor
market  as  a whole.  The  evolution  of  immigrant  employment  is  principally
determined by the inflows of foreign workers over the considered period of time.
Immigrant employment is concentrated in the service sectors as: construc-
tion, hotels and restaurants sectors etc. Nowadays, tertiary activities in devel-
oped countries account for a preponderant share of employment in general and
immigrant employment in particular.
The differences in term of unemployment between the native born popula-
tion and immigrants have decreased over the last ten years in most of European
countries. However, Germany and France have higher unemployment rates for
foreign born population then for native population. As for the children of immi-
grants, the unemployment rate is higher then for the children of natives. For the
second generation, the situation becomes better. In the recent immigration coun-
tries (Spain and Italy), place of birth makes little difference to unemployment
rate. 
1.3. Pension systems
In the long run, the increasing public expenditure on pensions, social secu-
rity and health services seems to be the most important issue of the ageing
process, because of the speed with which it will develop once the baby boom ge-
neration will cross the age of retirement. 
According to European Commission Report (2006), ìThe Impact of Ageing on
Public  Expenditure:  Projections  for  the  EU-25  Member  States  on  Pensions,
Health  Care,  Long-term  Care,  Education  and  Unemployment  Transfers
(2004ñ2050)î, ?for the EU-15 and the Euro area as a whole, public spending is
projected to increase by about 4 percentage points between 2004 and 2050, main-
ly due to increases in public spending on pensions, health care and long-term
care.  The  budgetary  impact  of  ageing  becomes  visible  starting  with  2010.
However the largest increases in public spending are projected to take place
between 2020 and 2040. 
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2.1. An overview
By now, the attention of economists focuses on the direct impact of popula-
tion ageing on pay-as-you-go pension system. Overlapping generations-models
are constructed to analyse intergenerational and intragenerational aspects of
the sustainability of social security. In this context, migration is regarded as
a possible  factor  in  overcoming  the  problems  of  the  public  pension  systems.
Regarding the overall fiscal influence of migration on host countries there is
a large debate in the economic literature. Immigrants affect a countryís fiscal
system in many different ways, starting from the moment of arrival and continu-
ing throughout the life cycle (or as long as the immigrant remains in the coun-
try).
2.2. Immigration and pension funds
Population decline could be prevented by immigration, but population age-
ing could be prevented only at unprecedented, unsustainable and increasing lev-
els of inflows. This would generate very rapid population growth and rapidly dis-
place the original population from its majority position. Coleman in his study
ìëReplacement  Migrationí,  or  why  everyoneís  going  to  have  to  live  in  Koreaî
reviews the options available in response to population ageing, through work-
force, productivity, pensions reform and other means. Immigration cannot alle-
viate population ageing because this one is not caused by a deficit of migration
but by a decline in fertility. Changes in pension systems and in the retirement
age such that to increase the work force participation in later life could be more
appropriate then additional migration. These options could be complemented by
a change of the PAYG systems to a funded system. The latter, may imply among
other, investing on countries with higher potential in human resources and high-
er economic growth.
Concerning pension systems, Saczuk (2003) explain in his paper about the
replacement migration that, immigrants make little contribution to receiving
countriesí pension funds. Institutional changes of these systems seem to be both
more realistic and more effective. 
Wildasin (1994) and Razin & Sadka (1995) show that in a static environment
all income groups may lose from migration. In contrast to the adverse effects of
law skilled migration in a static model, Razin and Sadka (1998) prove that in
a Samuelsonian overlapping generation model, the migration is a Pareto improv-
ing measure. Later, they stated and proved that with a pay-as-you-go pension
scheme,  an  important  pillar  of  welfare  state,  even  the  low  skilled  migration
could be beneficial. There are two conditions. The first one is that the economy
has good access to international capital markets, so that migration exerts no
major effect on factor prices. The second one is the infinite-horizon, the overlap-
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to the pension system, their contribution does not suffice to support the increase
benefit to the old at the time of the migrantsí arrival.
2.3. Accompanying measures in sustaining pension funds
Leers et al. (2003) show that migration may not be a cure for ageing. The
hypothesis that the decrease in fertility implies the increase in wages and thus
obtaining an inflow of immigrants that moderates the adverse effects of ageing
on public pensions, may not hold if labour is heterogeneous. If the rising depend-
ency ratio induces a strong enough increase in the PAYG-tax, the mobile work-
ers may even decide to leave the ageing country and thus worsen the trouble. In
the case of homogeneity, the immigration of workers will take place until the
working population is re-established at initial level, preventing the old from
a wealth  loss.  This  exceptional  case  only  applies  to  a small  open  economy.
Otherwise, the inflow of labour will lead to higher wages abroad and ageing will
result in less than full replacement of the number of workers before the demo-
graphic  shock.  As  a result,  wages  will  increase  and  pension  benefits  will
decrease. 
The work of Blake and Mayhew (2004) suggests that beyond 2020, some
accompanying measures such as increasing contribution rates and/or the state
pension age will be necessary to manage the pension increases due to population
ageing. After 2020 the necessary levels of immigration will increase to unrealis-
tic and unsustainable levels. Although, an increase in UK fertility rates over the
next few years would be beneficial since this would help boost the contribution
base in the longer term, but it would not solve the problems in the decade begin-
ning in 2020.
Conclusion
While EU is a relatively wealthy and politically stable world region with an
aging population, and neighbouring countries to the South and South-East are
much poorer and politically and economically less stable, but have young and
growing populations, migration from south to north is almost inevitable. The
enlargement of EU may further complicate the issue of sustainability of pension
systems, as long as the new member states face similar demographic problems.
It is important to recognise the significant implications for employment policies
that  an  enlarged  Union  will  represent.  The  existing  differential  in  economic
terms is expected to generate a considerable inflow of immigrants from these
countries. The challenge, therefore, is how to manage ñ not how to prevent ñ
migration to Europe.
In conclusion, finding the appropriate measures to overcome the side effects
of the ageing process in developed countries is a quite complicated issue that
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country represent a different situation not only because of the demographic pat-
terns but also because its own socioeconomic reality. Economic and social insti-
tutions are often different too. 
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Ryzyko nierównowagi w finansowaniu polityki ubezpieczeñ spo³ecznych
w kontekœcie zmian demograficznych
Streszczenie
W kolejnych dekadach kraje rozwiniÍte doúwiadczπ dramatycznych zmian
w trendach demograficznych. Zmiana struktury wiekowej emerytÛw, przechodze-
nie  na  niπ  osÛb  z pokoleÒ  wyøu  demograficznego,  wyd≥uøenie  czasu  ich  øycia
i zmniejszenie stopnia dzietnoúci m≥odszych pokoleÒ mogπ zmodyfikowaÊ jej wiel-
koúÊ. Stopniowo nastÍpujπce starzenie siÍ spo≥eczeÒstw w krajach europejskich
znacznie obciπøy systemy emerytalne, szczegÛlnie te najczÍúciej obowiπzujπce typu
pay-as-you-go. W ostatnim czasie uwaøa siÍ, øe migracje ludzi z krajÛw s≥abiej
rozwiniÍtych mogπ zatrzymaÊ te negatywne trendy w krajach rozwiniÍtych ekono-
micznie. StrumieÒ migracji m≥odych osÛb do krajÛw rozwiniÍtych jest postrzega-
ny jako szansa ≥agodzenia ciÍøaru finansowego systemÛw emerytalnych. Celem
artyku≥u jest wyjaúnienie zjawiska zmian na rynku pracy i ubezpieczeÒ spo≥ecz-
nych oraz wynikajπcych z tego zmian w polityce makroekonomicznej. Specjalna
uwaga skupiona jest na analizie ryzyka braku rÛwnowagi w finansowaniu ubez-
pieczeÒ spo≥ecznych w kontekúcie zachodzπcych zmian demograficznych.
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Table 1. Total Population (in ‘ 000)
France Germany Italy UK EU





Scenario I 59 883 73 303 41 197 56 667 331 307
Scenario II 59 357 58 812 40 722 55 594 310 839
Scenario III 61 121 81 661 57 338 58 833 372 440
Scenario IV 67 130 92 022 66 395 64 354 418 509
Scenario V 81 719 113 181 87 345 74 398 519 965
Scenario VI 187 193 299 272 193 518 136 138 1 228 341
Bijak et al.
(UE 27)
Low Scenario 64 230 71 096 48 280 52 292 446 928
Base Scenario 70 381 77 007 54 044 65 481 494 922
High Scenario 79 189 86 093 62 813 74 353 562 967
No Migration Scenario 60 149 63 151 43 678 55 020 414 730
Table 2. Potential Support Ratio (in %)
France Germany Italy UK EU
PSR 2002 4.00 3.91 3.55 4.19 4.19
UE projections (UE 15) 2.26 1.75 1.52 2.36 1.89
Bijak et al.
(UE 27)
Low Scenario 1.97 1.53 1.33 1.99 1.64
Base Scenario 2.15 1.72 1.48 2.19 1.82
High Scenario 2.38 1.97 1.70 2.47 2.05
No Migration Scenario 1.87 1.42 1.22 1.89 1.56
Table 3. Total Fertility Rate (in %)
France Germany Italy UK EU
UE projections (2045–2050) (UE 15) 1.96 1.64 1.66 1.9 1.8
Bijak et al. (UE 27) 1.90 1.50 1.50 1.8 –
Alders et al. 1.80 1.40 1.40 1.8 –
Table 4. Life Expectancy (years)
France Germany Italy UK
Bijak et al.
Male  84.7 84.7 85.0 84.8
Female 89.7 88.6 89.8 87.9
Alders et al.
Male  85.5 84.9 85.7 83.4
Female 89.7 89.1 89.8 87.5
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Table 5. Yearly Net Migration (in ‘000)




Scenario I 110 2519 109 341 724
Scenario II 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario III 500 4 244 4 414 899 2 548
Scenario IV 1 854 6 009 6 531 2 132 4 262
Scenario V 5 423 9 842 12 248 4 643 8 188
Scenario VI 30 430 44 825 39 818 20 383 36 194
Bijak 
(UE 27)
Low Scenario 44 723 61 903 57 321 44 424 –
Base Scenario 149 075 206 342 171 963 148 080 –
High Scenario 289 151 412 683 343 926 296 160 –
Alder & al. 1.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 –
UE Projections: Average annual net number of migrants between 2000 and 2050, per million inhabitants in 2000,
by scenario and country or region
Bijak et al. : Yearly net migration from the Rest of the world for 2052
Alders et al.: Net migration (per 1,000 population in 2000) for 2049





1995 68,4 .. 59,4
2000 69,6 72,1 64,9
2005 69,6 74,8 68,6
Foreign-born
1995 66,7 .. 64,2
2000 67,4 64,8 71,4




1995 11,2 .. 22,8
2000 9,4 7,4 13,9
2005 8,6 10,4 9,1
Foreign-born
1995 17,6 .. 27,0
2000 16,7 12,6 15,9




1995 60,7 .. 45,8
2000 63,1 66,7 55,9
2005 63,6 67,0 62,3
Foreign-born
1995 55,0 .. 46,8
2000 56,2 56,7 60,0
2005 56,8 57,0 69,8
Source: OECD Annual Report 2007, International Migration Outlook.
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Table 7. Skilled Immigration
Immigrants 
(% in total population)
Skilled immigrants (% in total number of immigrants)
M M F F
1995 2005 1990 2000 1990 2000
France 8.7 8.5 21.9 21.9 8.6 16.4
Germany 5.5 7.3 21.8 25.5 17.0 21.0
Spain 3.3 4.5 9.5 12.2 17.5 16.8
UK 6.8 8.3 13.9 17.8 20.5 34.5
US 8.7 11.7 39.2 51.3 40.1 42.5
EU 15 5.5 6.7 15.5 18.6 17.1 23.1
Source: Docquier, Marouk (2005).
Table 8. Age Structure of Migration (in 2006)
15–24 25–44 45–64 >65
France 66 25 9
Spain 16 41 20 23
Germany 8 40 27 25
Source: IXIS CIB database.
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